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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FLORENCE SCHWEITZER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
HARVEY STONE, S & I TRUCKING COMPANY, 
LLOYD V. HIGGINBOTHAM AND WE,STERN 
AUTO TRANSPORT COMPANY, 
Defendants and Appellants 
vs. 
IVAN SHEFFY, 
Intervenor and Respondent 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants statement of Facts are essentially cor-
rect, but as hereinafter supplemented and in some in-
stances controverted. 
STATE1IENT OF POINTS 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR APPELLANTS OR 
IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL .. 
II. 
. . 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO ADMIT EXHIBIT H-30 INTO EVIDENCE. 
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III. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL· COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR APPELLANTS OR 
IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL. 
Appellants cite 49 (b) U.R.C.P. to support their 
contention. This rule is of no import here, because in 
the instant case we have these findings relative to ap-
pellants liability to Sheffy: 
1. Higginbotham was found n:egligent. (Special 
Verdict, QII) . 
2. Higginbotham's negligence was found to be a 
proximate cause of the collision. (Special Ver-
dict, Q. II). 
3. Sheffy was found to be negligent. (Special Ver-
dict, Q III) . 
4. Sheffy's negligence was found not to he a proxi-
mate cause of his injuries. {Special Verdict, 
Q III). 
5. Sheffy was found to have suffered damage of 
Four Thousand Five Hundred ($4,500.00) Dol-
lars. (Special Verdict, Q VC). 
These findings ar>e consistent \vith each other and 
consistent with the general verdict. Since there is no 
inconsistency between the findings and the verdict, 
Rule 49 (b) does not apply; or if it does, it requires 
the court to direct the entry of the appropriate judg-
ment as was done in this case. 
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Evidence submitted to the JUry included the fol-
lowing: 
The rear of th:e Stone truck had five clearance 
lights, 2 large reflectors, and a taillight. (Tr. 255-256). 
All these lights were operating properly a few minutes 
before the collision ( Tr. 257), and were lighted while 
Stone and Sheffy were working on the truck. (Tr. 79).· 
The truck was on a slight angle, but within the 
outside lane (Tr. 87). The jury found Stone was not 
negligent in the matter of parking the truck. (Special 
Verdict Q I). 
Sheffy had previously experienced stalling becaus.e 
of switching tanks and thought it would be safer .to 
start the truck and get out of there than to take time 
setting out flares, since he anticipated it would take 
just a f:ew moments to get it running. (Tr. 308). 
There is 8/lOths of a mile visibility to the west, the 
direction Appellant's truck was approaching. (Pre trial 
order, R-25 ). Higginbotha1n didn't see the truck until 
he was just 70 .feet away, although there wer~e no ob-
structions, other cars passing, or emergencies or dis-
tractions. ( Tr. 92, 93, 94). 
Sheffy was at the truck working for one-half minute 
to one minute when the accident happened. (Tr. 265). 
The question of proximate cause is in nearly all 
cases a question for the jury. Hess v. Robinson, 163 P. 
2d 510. Appellant cites Gibbs v. Blue Cab, 122 Ut. 312, 
249 P. 2d 213, to support the contention that Sheffy's 
negligence was as a matter of law the proximate cause. 
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In the Gibbs case, contributory negligence and proxi-
mate cause were held for the jury, on the basis -that 
even if there had been a light on decedent's bicycle, the 
car driver may not have seen it. The same situation 
exists here-if Higginbotham could not see a white, 
25,000 lbs. truck and tractor with refl:ectors and clear-
ance lights, could he have seen a flare 1 In this con-
nection it should be noted that the physical evidence gave 
no corroboration to Higginbotham's claim that he saw 
the truck at 70 feet, and tried to avoid it. ( Tr. 152, 156). 
This case is a clear example of the situation referred 
to by this court in the cases Hillyard v. Utah By-Pro-
ducts Co., 1 Ut. 2d 143, 263 P. 2d 287, and McMurdie vs 
Underwood, 9 Ut. 2, 400, 346 P. 2, 711, as follows: 
"In applying the test of forese:eability to situ-
ations where a negligently created preexisting 
condition combines with a later act of negligence 
causing an injury, the courts have drawn a clear-
cut distinction between two classes of cases. The 
first situation is where one has negligently cre-
ated a dangerous condition (such as parking the 
truck) and a later actor observed, or circumstan-
ces are such that he could not fail to observe, 
but negligently failed to avoid it. The second 
situation involves conduct of a later intervening 
actor who negligently failed to observe the dan-
gerous condition until it is too late to avoid 
it. In regard to the first situation it is held as a 
matter of law that the later intervening act do·es 
interrupt the natural sequence of events and cut 
off the legal effect of the negligence of the initial 
actor. This is based upon the reasoning that it is 
not reasonably to be forseen or expected that one 
who actually becomes cognizant of a dangerous 
4 -
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condition in atnple time to avert injury will fail 
to do so. On the other hand, with respect.. to . the· 
second situation, where the second actor fails to 
s~e the danger in time to avoid it, it is held that 
a jury question exists, based on the rationale that 
it can reasonably be anticipated that circumstan-
ces may arise vvherein others may not observe 
the dangerous condition until too late to escap:e 
it. The distinction is basicaHy one between a 
situation in which the second actor has sufficient 
time, after being charged with knowledge of the 
hazard, to avoid it, and one in which th:e second 
actor negligently becomes confronted with an 
emergency situation." 
The serious question would seem to be· whether 
Higginbotham's negligence was not th1e sole proximate 
cause as a matter of law, under the McMurdie and Hill_. 
yard cases. Certainly there is no basis for asserting, 
as appellant does, that no evidence of intervening caus·e 
exists. 
The conclusion from this must b~ that if there were 
an independent suit, with Sheffy and Appell~nts the 
only parties, the jury's findings and verdict are sup-
ported by the evidence and would be unquestionably up-
held. The reason this should not be done here, it is 
claimed, is a seeming discrepancy bet\ve'en the jury find-
ings as to Stone and as to Sheffy . 
. In point of fact, Sheffy's lawsuit is separate and 
distinguishable from the other suits here tried. ·Sheffy, 
as a plaintiff in intervention, was allowed to intervene 
under 24 (b), U.R.C.P., because his lawsuit inv.olved a 
~ommon question of .law o~ fact, i.e., the n~gligence of 
Iliggil):botham. This is the . same. criteria .. used to de-
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termine if actions should be consolidated .under 42 (a) 
U.R.C.P. 
When the inconsistent findings arise between find-
ings of the same jury in two different lawsuits, the 
verdict need not be consistent. Brown vs. Parker, 
Arkansas, 1950, 233 S.W. 2d 64 is in point. This case 
involved a three car intersection collision, and two re-
sulting actions were consolidated for trial. In one action, 
the driver of the northbound car recovered from the 
driver of the west bound car, thus being a finding of 
negligence against the west-bound driver. There was 
no evidence of any negligence on the part of the east-
bound car, yet the same jury returned a verdict against 
the east-bound driver on his suit against the same west-
bound driver. In answering the claim of an inconsistent 
verdict, the Arkansas Supreme Court said: 
"The answer to this argument must be that the 
law imposes no requirement of consistency upon 
jurors hearing separate cases which are con-
solidated for purposes of trial. If such separate 
cases were being tried separately, by different 
juries, there would be no assurance of consistency 
in the verdicts, and no greater assurance of con-
sistency is insisted upon when one jury tries both 
cases together. As this Court said in Leech v. 
Missouri Pac. R. Co., 189 Ark. 161, 164, 71 S.W. 
2d 467, 468; 'It does not follow, however, that be-
cause two separate and distinct causes of action 
are tried by the same jury that the findings of 
facts in one cause is binding on the jury in the 
otller cause of action if there is a dispute in the 
testimony. Although there was evidence tending 
to show concurrent negligence on the part of 
Graham and appellee and no negligence on the 
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part of the deceased, yet there was evidence tend-
ing to show no negligence on the part of appellee, 
and the jury was at liberty to so find in the cause 
of action on behalf of appellant for the benefit 
of herself and son, as much so as if the two 
caus'es of action had been tried separately in-
stead of together. Notwithstanding the causes 
of action may be tried together under the pro-
visions of the statute, they are wholly independent 
of each other, and tile finding of the jury in one 
is not binding upon the jury in the other if the 
facts are in dispute as they were in this case.' To 
the same effect, see Green v. W'est Memphis 
Lumber Co., 192 Ark. 1177, 91 S.W. 2d 261." 
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled on a similar 
situation in Baldwin v. Ewing, 1949, 204 P 2d 430. In 
this case a minor, John H. Baldwin (by his guardian) 
filed an action against defendant for injuries rec'eived 
in an auton1obile accident. The minor's father Matthew 
Bald\vin, in a separate suit filed an action for special 
damages incurred. The two cases were consolidated and 
tried to a jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor 
of the father, and against the minor. The trial Court 
granted a motion for new trial, and upon appeal the 
Supre1ne Court affirmed the original jury verdicts : 
"It is urged by respondent, John H. Baldwin, that: 
" 'Having rendered a verdict in favor of l\fatthew 
Baldwin for the full amount for which he sued 
was clearly an expression on the part of the jury 
that the defendant, Ewing, was guilty of negli-
gence which proximately caused the collision,· and 
that John H. Baldwin was not guilty of contri-
buting (contributory) negligence which was a 
proximate cause of said collision, and that the 
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said John H. Baldwin did not have the last clear 
chance to prevent the coJlision.' 
"It is apparent that it was on the theory stated 
in the foregoing quotation that the motion for a 
new trial was made, and upon \vhich the trial 
court acted in granting the new trial. 
"It must be kept in mind that, while the two cases 
were consolidated for the purpose of trial, they 
remain two separate and distinct cases, both in 
law and in fact. Let us assume, only for the 
purpose of illustrating the point, that the cases 
had been tried separately and by a differ'ent jury, 
or the same jury. Could it be successfully con-
tended that the finding of the jury in either of 
the cases would be binding upon the jury in the 
other case 1· We think not. And the fact that 
the jury may have reached a different conclusion 
on the question of negligence her·e does not violate 
the rule as to such finding." 
Thus, we submit that even if the findings as to 
Sheffy were to be deemed inconsistent with th'e find-
ings as to Stone, nevertheless Sheffy is entitled to have 
a jury pass upon his lawsuit, and as long the the evi-
d'ence supports the findings and judgment as to Sheffy 
that judgment may not be overturned. 
The next question considered is whether there in 
reality is any inconsistency in the jury findings. The 
findings here attacked ar'e findings as to two separate 
individuals, under different duties, and doing different 
acts. Stone was found negligent of (1) running out of 
gas, and (2) failing to have lights on or flares about 
his truck. Sheffy, on the other hand, was found negli-
gent in (1) exposing hims'elf to a hazard, and (2) fail-
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ing to keep a lookout. Stone's negligent acts were 
found to be a proximate cause of the collision and 
Shf\ffy's negligence was found not to have proximately 
contributed to his injuries. The jury was instructed on 
proximate cause, negligence, contributory negligence 
and all other essential matters, and the evidence sup-
ports the jury verdict. 
The cas·es cited by appellants are of no persuasion 
here, because they deal only with situations where the 
jury finds the same act of the same individual to be 
negligent and non-negligent. 
The findings and verdict of the jury should be up-
held if it can reasonably be done. 89 C.J.S. Trial, Sec. 
562. As was said in the case of Flusk vs Erie R. Co. 
1953, U.S.D.C., 110 F. Supp. 118: 
~'Doubtless because of the unusual situation here 
presented, wher'e, two actions were tried together, 
with a general verdict in one and a special verdict 
in the other, this court has been referred to no 
precedents dir'ectly in point. But it would seem 
that, if any inconsistency between verdicts in 
two different cases is to be considered at all, as 
to which there is question, the strict rule perti-
n·ent to a single case should be applied, a fortiori, 
i.e., that the validity of these two verdicts in 
these separate cases should be upheld unless they 
are irreconcilably in conflict.'' 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURrr DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO ADMIT EXHIBIT H-30 INTO EVIDENCE. 
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At the .outset -it should be obse-rved that although 
Appellants .call attention to United. St~tes .Constitution 
and to Federal Statutes relating to recognition by one 
State of the public acts and records of another State, 
they make no claim that 28 U.S.C.A., Section 1739 is 
here applicable. This is because the formal requirements 
of that section were not met by Exhibit H-30, and 
accordingly, the admissibility of the document is de-
termined solely by Utah law and practice. 32 C.J.S 
Evidence Section 673 b. 
To determine the question under Utah law, we sub-
mit three matters must be considered: 
( 1) Were the records offered "official records" or 
"official documents" so as to come under the provisions 
of -Rule 44a, U.R.C.P.1 
One case that is enlightening, is Olender v. United 
States, 210 F. 2d 795 42 ALR 2d 736, where the govern-
ment attempted to introduce the files of the State W el-
fare department into evidence. In holding them inadmis-
sible, the Court said: 
"There remains the inter'esting question whether 
the file (Ex. 55) should have been excluded as 
hearsay. The file was introduced and ·received 
in evidence under the official docu1nents ·except-
ion to the hearsay rule. This exception to the hear-
say rule was recognized at comm.on law. (Cases 
cited) For official docu1nents of the United 
. States Govern1nent the ~exception is now.·provided 
10 
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for in 28 USCA, Sec. 1733, which is made appli-
cable to criminal cases by Rule 27, Fed. Rules 
Crim. Pr&c., 18 USCA. As has been pointed out, 
however, this statute deals primarily with the 
m'ethod of proof of official documents and is of 
no aid in determining what kinds of official docu-
ments are admissible. (Cases cited) Such ques-
tions must be worked out in accordance with the 
principles of the common law 'as they may be 
interpreted by tlle courts of the United States in 
the light of reason and experience'. Rule 26 
Fed. Rules Crim. Prac., 18 USCA. For purposes 
of applying the rule no difference has be'en recog-
nized between documents of federal, state and 
county governments. (Cases cited), 
"Gen'eTally stated, the rule is that all documents 
prepared by public official pursuant to a duty 
imposed by law or required by the nature of 
their offices are admissible as proof of the facts 
stated therein. (Cases cited) The r'eason of 
the rule is that it would be burdensome and in-
convenient to call public officials to appear in 
the myriad cases in which their testimony might 
be required in a court of law, and that records 
and reports prepared by such officials in the 
course of their duties are generally trustworthy. 
(Cases cited)" 
"Since the official documents are a substitute for 
the p~ersonal appearance of the official in court, 
it is generally held that such documents, to be 
admissible, must concern matters to which the 
official could testify if he were called to the 
witness stand. (Cases cited) Thus, this circuit 
and most of th·e other circuits which have passed 
on the question have held that the facts stated 
in the documents must have been within the 
11 
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personal ·knowledge and observation· of ':the re-
··' ... cordi:q.g.:official.or ~-his. subordinates;; and:·:that r'e-
.. ports based .upon· .general investigations and upon 
. information gleaned second hand: from random 
sources must be excluded. (Cases cited)" 
"The documents in Government Exhibit 55 may 
be divided into two groups. The first group con-
sists of the documents prepared by persons and 
firms outside the public agency concerned-the 
statements and affidavits of 1\'Irs. Foote, Mrs. 
· Olender and the five banks The second group 
consists of the . records, the reports prepared by 
investigators and officials of the l3'resilo · County 
Public Welfare Department." 
"The documents in the first group. were clearly 
outside the official document rule. They were 
not prepared by public officials pursuant to the 
duties of their offices." 
The documents offered in th·e trial of our case are 
similar in nature to the ones declined in the Olender 
Case, since they were not prepared by any public official 
in tlle course of his duties.. The record offered was a 
statement by the attending physician and a fee bill. 
The mere fact that a paper is kept in a public file does 
not render it an official record within the meaning of 
the rul1e. As is stated in 20 American Jurisprudence, 
Evidence, Sec. 1027: 
"The ·report of an accident tnade to a public of-
ficial "bY a person involved therein, in pursuance 
of a statutory duty, is_ generally~ not admissible 
in .. evidence at th'e trial. There:- is, how~ver, a 
wid~ differ_ence between a report 1nade by a 
private citizen to a public officer, .th_ough made 
12 
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compulsory by statute, and one made by a public 
official in th·e performance of his duty; reliance 
can safely be placed on the action of the latter, 
taken under the sanction of his office, but not a 
report made by a private citizen." 
Again, American Jurisprudence states the general 
law regarding records or reports at Sec. 1026. 
"There is no rule prescribing the precise charac-
ter of records, reports, and other documents which 
are admissible under the exception to the hearsay 
ru1e, which permits the use in evidence of records 
and 'reports of administrative officers. The 
courts hold to be admissible a great variety of 
books, registers, records, and other official writ-
ings. It may be stated as a broad gen'eral rule 
that any book of entry, record, or report made by 
such officers in the discharge of a public and 
official duty imposed upon them by statute by 
the nature of the office or by a superior officer 
is admissible, provided of course it is relevant 
and material to the controversy at hand." 
It will be noted that all three of the cases appellants 
cite in this connection deal with the writings and re-
ports of public officials. Federal and State Analysts 
in the Hardison case, experts of the U. S. Bureau of 
Mines in the Moran case, and Federal Narcotic Agents 
and clients in the Ware case. In all 3 cases, the safe-
guard set up by the requirement that the r~eport be made 
by a public official in the course of his duties were met. 
These requirements were not met in our cas;e. There 
is no evidence in the record that Wyoming law requires 
the attending physician to make the reports in H-30 to 
the Director of W orkmens Compensation. 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
_ . _ 2. Di~ the offered records comply with· the require-
ments of 44a U.R.C.P. ~ .. ·This r.ule···pr.ovides::.for two 
separate qualifications: 
.... 
First, the copy must be attested by the offic.er having 
custody of the original, or his deputy, ·and 
Second, it must be accompanied by a certificat_e 
that such officer has the custody, such certificate to 
be made (in this case) by any public officer having a 
seal of office and having official duties in the district 
where the record is kept, authenticated by the· seal of 
his office. 
Rule 44A, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is 
identical to our rule on thes·e requirements. This rule 
was considered in McWilliams Dr'edging Co. v U.S., 
105 F. Supp. 582. In this case the certification was: 
"A true copy of the original, 
I certify 
A. A. Genter (Signature) 
Ass't Coli. of Customs" 
The court held this insufficient, saying "under Rule 44 
of the Civil Rules, these photostats should have been 
accompanied with a certificate that the attesting officer 
had the custody of these records." 
A very similar situation was considered in Van 
. . . 
Cedarfield v. Laroche, 252 F. 2, 817. In thi~ case the 
appellants offered a photostatic copy_ of an application 
for title of a car, for the purpose of sh~wing_ owner-
ship of the car involved in a collision. By 'vay ·of 
authentication, they offered a certificate bearing the 
14 
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signature of a section chief acting for Robert A. Theo-
bald, the Director of Revenue of Colorado, certifying 
the attached document was a true copy of an original 
on file in his department; and a certificate by the Sec-
retary of State of Colorado under the great seal of the 
state certifying as to the correctness of an attached 
executive order appointing Theobald Director of 
Revenue. The Court held the document inadmissible, 
(upon the ground that thH certificate lacked the seal 
of the office of Director of Revenue) and in doing so 
said that since the Secretary of State's certificate did 
not certify that the Director of Revenue had custody of 
the records, the requirements of 44a were not met. 
In the instant case, one certificate attempted to 
satisfy both requirements of attestation and certifi-
cation. The rule clearly contemplates and requires 
attestation by one person together with a certificate 
by another official that the first person has custody. 
The dual requirements of rule would be defeated if 
one official were allowed to attest the instrument and 
also certify that he has legal custody. In point of 
fact, there· is no certification that the attesting officer 
(Wm. P. Petry) has custody of the records offered; 
there is only his certificate that the record is a copy of 
a like document in the files of the department. This 
is not in any way the equivalent of a certificate by a 
public officer that the attesting officer (Wm. P. Petry) 
has the custody of the original document. 
Appellants assert the court should have taken ju-
dicial notice that Wm. P. Petry had custody of the docu-
ment in question. No offer of proof as to Wyoming 
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law was made. The suggestion is made that Wyomi;r:1g 
~~w will be presumed to .be the same as. Utah law .. 'In 
this connection, it is to be _noted that Utah does not 
even have a Director of W orkment Compensation. 
Under 78-25-1, U.C.A. 1953, !eight categories of facts that 
judicial knowledge will be taken of are listed. Of course, 
our situation does not come under any one of them. The 
case of State v. Lawrence, 120 Ut. 323, 234 P. 2 600, is 
cited as holding that this statute is not ;exclusive, and 
that judicial knowledge will be taken of other facts as 
well.. In the Lawrence case the court spoke as follows: 
"The word 'knowledge' in the foregoing section 
is appar;ently used advisedly, there being a dis-
tinction between 'judicial knowledge' of the pub-
lic records, laws, etc. which the court is deemed 
to know by virtue of his office and 'judicial notice' 
of things which are commonly known." 
It should further be noted that Rule 44 (a) tefers 
to judicial knowledge, not judicial notice, and 78-25-1 
U.C.A. 1953 outlines judicial knowledge with respect 
to public and official acts and duties. The conclusion 
fro1n this, we submit, is that absent judicial knowledge, 
as set out in 78-25-1, U.C.A. 1953, there must be either 
(1) competent evidence of the custody of the attesting 
officer, or (2) that the attesting officer has custody. 
Since neither requirement was met, the standards of 
admission were not complied with under Rule 44 (a). 
3. Even if the Exhibit H-30 is admissible evidence, 
was its exclusion prejudicial~ 
Rule 61, U.R.C.P., provides "No error_ in * ~ the 
exclusion of evidence • * * is ground for -granting .. a 
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new trial • • • unless refusal to take such action appears 
to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The 
court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard 
any error or defect in the proceeding which does not 
affect the substantial rights of the parties.', Before 
appellant is 'entitled to prevail, he must show both error 
and prejudice. Starlin v. Madsen, 120 Ut. 631, 237 P. 
2d 834. With that in mind, let us examine the nature 
of the excluded evidence. 
The report of Dr. Robert Knapp of Pinedale, Wyo-
ming, 'vas off'ered by Sheffy as medical testimony con-
cerning his injuries. This consisted of two hand written 
small pages, stating the examinatons made, the negative 
x-rays, that apparently the soft tissue damage would 
improve no further, and that a five (5%) percent part-
ial disability would attach. This report was written 
December 7, 1958, based on a last examination of De-
cember 6, 1958. Counsel for Western Auto introduced 
a report from Dr. Lamb, noted orthopedist in Salt Lake 
City, this report being based on an examination and 
study of x-rays made October 20, 1959·. Dr. Lamb found 
impairment still present, but gave as his opinion that 
it would not be permanent. 
The offered Exhibit H-30 contained reports made 
between April and August, 1957, over a year prior to 
Dr. Knapp's report of December 6, 1958, and over two 
years prior to the examination of Dr. Lamb. In fact, 
the reports in H-30 are not necessarily inconsistent with 
the December 6, 1958 report of Dr. Knapp. H-30 shows 
that during treatment of the injury, up to August 1957, 
Dr. Knapp considered the injury not permanent; on 
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D,ecember 6, 1958 upon final examination he concluded 
there would be no complete recovery. . He .characterized 
it as a "minor" impairment. 
Thus counsel for appellant had full advantage of 
arguing the more recent report of their specialist 
against the year old report of Dr. Knapp and admission 
of Exhibit H-30 would have given the jury no further 
evidence for their deliberations and would in fact have 
offered only a slight basis for arguing contradictory 
statements or impeachment. 
We submit that even if the docu1nents were admis-
sible their exclusion has not been demonstrated by appel-
lant to have been prejudicial or to have deprived them 
of any substantial rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the trial court properly 
exercised its discretion in refusing to direct a verdict 
and in refusing to grant appellants a new trial. The 
evidence amply supports the verdict and the judgment 
and in the interests of substantial justice should he 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Howell, Stine and Olmstead and 
Richard W. Ca1npbell 
Attorneys for lnte'rvenor and 
Respondent. 
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